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According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of pa-
ternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the
paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about
what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them.
Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers
that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satis-
faction. By appealing to these powers, my version of the rational will view can rank
the wrongfulness of paternalistic acts in terms of (a) the extent to which such acts
amount to supplanting the paternalized individual’s identity as a rational agent
with that of the paternalist, and (b) the degree of mistrust in the paternalized
individual’s rational agency shown by the paternalistic act. My rational powers
account thus provides a more complete account of why paternalism is a powerful,
but not decisive or absolute, objection to an act or policy. My rational powers
account also provides powerful explanations of why rational suasion deflects
charges of paternalism; why consenting to intercessions in one’s rational agency
negates paternalism; why strong paternalism is generally more objectionable than
weak paternalism; and why hard paternalism is generally more objectionable than
soft paternalism.
1. Paternalism and our Rational Powers
Paternalism involves interfering with another person, against that per-
son’s will, in order to benefit that person in some way. This standard
characterization nevertheless leaves a philosophically crucial question
unaddressed: With what capacities or aspects of a person does a pa-
ternalistic act or policy interfere? Mill’s famous description of his
harm principle (Mill 1859, part I, 9) offers two competing answers
to that question.
On the one hand, Mill claims that others are not ‘warranted, indi-
vidually or collectively ’ in ‘interfering with’ a person’s ‘liberty of
action’ unless they do so for purposes of ‘self-protection’, that is, in
order to prevent that person from harming others. Interfering with a
person’s ability to act for her own good is not morally justified. Taken
as an expression of opposition to paternalism, Mill’s remarks suggest
that paternalism targets a person’s liberty, understood as the capacity
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to act as one desires. Let us call this the liberty view of paternalism’s
target.
On the other hand, some of Mill’s remarks emphasize the wrong-
fulness of certain means by which we might move others to act in
desirable ways. Compulsion, control, and coercion are ruled out,
whereas ‘remonstrating’, ‘reasoning’, ‘persuading’, and ‘entreating’
are permissible means to move others to act. These remarks suggest
that the heart of paternalism is not that it interferes with another’s
liberty as such but that it attempts to influence her behaviour through
non-rational causes—that it involves non-rational, or at least less than
fully rational, means of influence. The paternalist’s target is thus not
individual liberty per se, but an individual’s rational will or volition.
Here I will largely set aside the liberty view and concentrate on
defending the rational will view of paternalism, according to which
paternalism involves wrongful intercession in the operations of a per-
son’s rational will. I am not the first to do so; my defence will build on
the work of theorists such as Seana Shiffrin (2000), Jonathan Quong
(2011, pp. 73-107), and Daniel Groll (2012). Central to their concep-
tions of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the
rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own (pre-
sumably superior) judgments about what ends the paternalized ought
to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Paternalistic actors thus
attempt to ‘take over or control’ the rational agency of another
(Shiffrin 2000, p. 216). Proponents of the rational will view readily
agree with the liberty view that paternalism often interferes with in-
dividuals’ liberty. Indeed, legal paternalism in particular tends to have
this characteristic (Quong 2011, pp. 75-6). However, on the rational
will view, interferences with a person’s liberty are paternalistic only
when (and because) they are also unauthorized intercessions in the
operations of their targets’ rational will.
My defence of the rational will view proceeds as follows. §1 de-
scribes the core commitments of the rational will view and shows
how the rational will view elegantly accounts for the role of rational
suasion and consent vis-a`-vis paternalism, as well as accounting for
certain otherwise puzzling categories of paternalistic action.
§2 provides the foundation for addressing an issue that adherents of
the rational will view have by and large not engaged. That an act or
policy is paternalistic should give us moral pause. Yet it would be
remarkable if even in cases where enormous benefit could be brought
about via paternalistic measures, such measures were impermissible
simply by virtue of being paternalistic. Paternalism looks like a
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powerful, but not necessarily decisive, reason to reject an act or policy.
This position—that paternalism is presumptively, but not necessarily
all-things-considered, morally impermissible—has a great deal of pre-
theoretical appeal.
The rational will view can allow that paternalism has the good or
rightmaking feature of advancing its targets’ ends or the ends those
targets ought to pursue. But the rational will view faces an unappre-
ciated difficulty in explaining how paternalism can be presumptively,
but not necessarily all-things-considered, morally impermissible.
Paternalistic acts fall into two conflicting moral kinds: They are ob-
jectionable because they are intercessions in a person’s rational will,
but praiseworthy insofar as they are acts of beneficence. Yet a pater-
nalistic act that instantiates the latter kind to a high degree remains
objectionable insofar as it belongs to the former kind. The possibility
that a paternalistic act might benefit its target to a large enough degree
to render it all-things-considered morally permissible seems to require
a way of weighing, however inexactly, these two considerations. It
might be assumed that such weighing involves only one variable,
namely, how much a target is benefitted by a paternalistic intercession.
It might be assumed that, where X and Y are two paternalistic acts, X
is all-things-considered morally justified if the quantum of benefit b to
X’s target meets or exceeds some threshold, whereas Y is not all-
things-considered morally justified if the quantum of benefit c to
Y’s target does not meet that threshold. One of my main aims here
is to suggest that this picture of the casuistry of paternalism is too
simple, for we cannot assume that X and Y should be assigned the
same weight by virtue of being paternalistic. Paternalistic intercessions
can engage with our rational wills in different ways. On an intuitive
level, a person who tries to encourage my frugality by insisting that I
not offer gifts on her birthday has engaged with my rational will in less
far reaching and less morally objectionable ways than the person who
tries to encourage my frugality by disabling the pop-up advertisements
on my computer that contribute to my compulsive spending. A more
credible casuistry of paternalism thus requires incorporating and
weighing two variables, the magnitude of benefit to the target of a
paternalistic act and the specific ways in which that act engages with
the target’s rational will. The rational will view would thus benefit
from an elaboration of the different ways in which paternalistic acts
engage with their targets’ rational wills.
I provide such an elaboration by spelling out the internal architec-
ture of our rational agency. More specifically, our rational agency is
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constituted by three rational powers, each of which plays a distinct
role in agents’ choice and action and each of which can be engaged by
the paternalistic actions of others. I argue in §3 that paternalistic
intercessions are wrong because and to the extent that they intercede
in these rational powers: These powers vary in their centrality to an
individual’s practical identity, such that the more central a power is to
the constitution of an individual’s practical identity, the more wrong-
ful are paternalistic interventions that engage that power. §4 offers a
second way of conceptualizing paternalism’s wrongmaking features in
terms of intercessions in our rational powers, namely, that paternal-
istic actors show varying levels of mistrust in the rational competency
of others based on which of these powers such actors intercede in. By
grasping the internal architecture of the rational will, we can thus see
how the rational will view might normatively weigh the wrongfulness
of paternalistic acts against their goodmaking feature (i.e., that, when
successful, they aid their targets in securing their ends or ends they
ought to seek). My rational powers account is thus a version of the
rational will view that improves upon it by demystifying the variety of
ways in which acts or policies can intercede in the rational wills of
others.
I turn to an objection in §5: If we have evidence that a potential
target of our paternalistic intercessions is in fact untrustworthy in the
exercise of her rational powers, why is it even pro tanto wrong to
intercede in those powers on her behalf ? I defend the notion that
respect for rational agency requires deference toward agents even
when they do not exercise that agency with full competence or
capability.
§6 highlights how my rational powers account explains common
philosophical stances about different varieties of paternalism.
2. The rational will view and its explanatory advantages
Rational will views of paternalism share two features. First, rational
will views require that paternalistic acts involve the substitution of the
paternalist’s judgment or agency for that of her target. Every account
of the nature of paternalism agrees that paternalists act, or try to
induce their targets to act, in ways that reflect what the paternalist
contends is good (in however broad a sense) for the target to do. As
the paternalist sees it, her target is disposed to choose or act either in
self-defeating ways, by failing to act in accordance with what the target
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antecedently believes to be good or desirable, or in foolish ways, by
failing to pursue ends or goods that, if the target were more reflective
or knowledgeable, she would pursue. What distinguishes the rational
will view is its emphasis on how paternalistic intercessions seek to
sever the usual causal relationship between the target’s judgment or
agency and the target’s choices or actions by interpolating the pater-
nalist’s own judgment. For adherents of this view, this feature is cen-
tral to the moral objectionability of paternalism. Seeking to guide
another’s actions or choices by one’s own lights rather than theirs
represents an ‘intrusion into and insult to [that] person’s range of
agency ’ (Shiffrin 2000, p. 218).1
Second, rational will views think of paternalism as motivated by the
belief that the target of paternalism is, when compared to the pater-
nalistic actor, deficient in some facet of her rational competence or
judgment.2 This second feature is a direct consequence of the first: In
order for paternalists to believe that the substitution of their judgment
for that of their targets is warranted, they cannot believe, on pain of
contradiction, that their own judgment is not superior to their targets’
with respect to the matter at hand. Of course, this belief in one’s
superior competence or judgment need not be global: A may believe
herself superior to B with respect to financial decisions but not with
respect to dietary ones, and so be inclined to financial paternalism but
not dietary paternalism, for instance. Moreover, this need entail nei-
ther that the paternalistic actor’s judgment is impeccable nor that the
target’s judgment is incompetent. A may believe that, while she is
merely competent with respect to financial decision making, B is a
complete financial neophyte who would benefit from her paternalism
1 As I see it, the intrusiveness of paternalism is normatively fundamental and the insult-
ingness derivative, that is, paternalism insults others because it intrudes upon others’ rational
agency, not vice versa. Cornell (2015) appears to disagree, offering an account of paternalism in
which its insulting ‘expressive content’ is fundamental. Others who emphasize that paternalism
is insulting or demeaning include Kleinig (1983), Feinberg (1986, pp. 23-4), and Anderson
(1999).
2 Groll (2012, p. 718) presents his version of the rational will view in terms of the target
being ‘likely to fail to exercise a capacity for sound judgement in the situation at hand’. Quong
(2011, pp. 80, 83) argues that paternalism is better described in terms of a ‘negative judgement’
about the target’s abilities than as a judgement that the target’s abilities are inferior. His chief
reason for this is that paternalistic actions sometimes depend on the belief that their targets
lack willpower, rather than poor judgement, and in these cases, the paternalizer need not think
that her willpower is superior to her targets. I do not share Quong’s assumption that lack of
willpower is not an instance of judgement, and while I agree that the paternalizer need not
believe his willpower is superior, his judgement is putatively superior in the sense that he
believes himself better situated to enable his target to realize her chosen ends.
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(whereas C, a financial expert, would be in a position to act paternal-
istically with respect to B and to A). Furthermore, the rational will
view does not entail that the paternalist literally sees her target as
childlike or infantile. She merely takes her target to be less competent
in her rational judgment or competency than she.3
So presented, the rational will view understands the wrongfulness of
paternalism as a complex wrong with both comparative and substan-
tive aspects (Quong 2011, pp. 100-2). First, paternalists treat their tar-
gets as if they are, with respect to the choices in which the paternalist
intercedes, inferior to them. Second, their treating their targets in this
way is manifest in intercessions in the operations of their agency or
volition. As I see it, neither the comparative nor the substantive as-
pects of paternalism are more morally basic, and they cannot be dis-
entangled without losing sight of the moral essence of paternalism.
Intercessions into other agents’ rational volition need not be paternal-
istic. Lying, arguably, intrudes into others’ rational volition but is
often not paternalistic. Similarly, there are other ways to treat others
as inferior without being paternalistic. But in concert, these two as-
pects underscore how the moral essence of paternalism is to deny its
targets their status as equal rational participants in social life, thereby
impugning, as Rawls (2005, p. 19) puts it, their ‘capacity to form, to
revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of [their] rational
advantage or good’.
Furthermore, the rational will view’s conception of paternalism’s
wrongfulness need not exhaust the ways in which paternalistic acts can
be wrong. Indeed, one complication in evaluating the moral serious-
ness of paternalistic acts is that the vast majority of such acts also fall
into other morally significant kinds. Most obviously, paternalistic acts
are beneficent insofar as they aim at their targets’ good. Conversely,
many paternalistic acts are also wrongs of another kind. They are acts
of violence, promise breaking, coercion, deception, manipulation, in-
trusions into privacy, etc.4 As a result, it can prove difficult to distil the
distinct contributions that paternalism makes to the all-things-con-
sidered moral properties of a paternalistic act. For instance, to what
degree is an act of paternalistic coercion wrong because it is coercive
and to what degree is it wrong because it is paternalistic? I make no
pretence of answering such questions with any precision here. My
3 De Marneffe (2006), for one, exaggerates Shiffrin’s account in this regard.
4 I hesitate to say that all paternalistic acts also fall into other act kinds that are typically
wrong. Paternalistic offers, for example, seem to lack any other morally troubling properties.
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main objective is to defend the rational will view as the correct ac-
count of the bad or wrongmaking feature of paternalism, and it would
be far too ambitious to offer a comprehensive casuistry of paternalistic
acts. However, I will later appeal to readers’ intuitive responses about
the moral wrongfulness or objectionability of different paternalistic
acts, and there is the very real danger that these responses will be
coloured by the fact that these acts also belong to other morally ob-
jectionable kinds. I make these remarks to urge readers to focus on the
paternalistic features of these acts and to set aside, to the extent pos-
sible, other good or badmaking features of these acts.
The rational will view appears to understand paternalism as a psy-
chological kind, as a set of attitudes that paternalists bear toward their
subjects. However, this psychological nature of paternalism can be
easily misunderstood. That paternalists necessarily have a certain set
of attitudes toward their subjects implies neither that paternalists
know they have these attitudes nor that they act under descriptions
referring to those attitudes. Indeed, in an important sense, paternalism
is always well intentioned, inasmuch as it seeks to make its subjects
better off. But this is wholly compatible with paternalists failing to
recognize how their paternalistic acts rest on judgments of their sub-
jects’ relative inferiority or how those acts intercede in their subjects’
rational volition. Hence, paternalism is perhaps best understood as an
action-theoretical kind, akin to ‘cruelty ’. Cruelty is most readily char-
acterized by referring to the psychology underlying cruel acts, that is,
as the wilful and knowing subjection of another to pain or distress.
But characterizing cruelty in this way does not preclude there being
unintentional cruelty, accidental cruelty, cruelty done through ignor-
ance, etc. Similarly, I have characterized paternalism psychologically,
in terms of the judgments and attitudes of paternalistic actors, even
though paternalism, like cruelty, can be accidental, unintentional,
done through ignorance, and the like. In this case, it proves perspicu-
ous to characterize the nominative (paternalism, or paternalistic acts)
in terms of the adverbial (acting paternalistically).5 Moreover, if pater-
nalism is an action-theoretical kind, then it is possible to ask relevant
moral questions about ‘impure’ instances of paternalism. Just as we
may ask whether, say, unintentional cruelty is as blameworthy as in-
tentional cruelty, we can ask whether unintentional paternalism is as
5 I take my claim that paternalism is an action-theoretical kind to be in the spirit of the
proposal in Grill (2007) that paternalism rests on the ‘invocation of certain reasons for certain
actions’.
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blameworthy as intentional paternalism. I do not address such ques-
tions here. I merely point out that understanding paternalism as an
action-theoretical kind enables us to differentiate between, and mor-
ally interrogate, instances of paternalism whose psychological under-
pinnings differ from the paradigm instances of paternalism.
Understanding paternalism as an action-theoretical kind also en-
ables the rational will view to account for two sorts of paternalistic acts
that might otherwise seem puzzling.
First, the rational will view can allow for paternalistic omissions
(Dworkin 2013a, p. 29ff.). The simplest example is a paternalist with-
holding information from her target for the latter’s benefit.
Admittedly, such withholding does not interfere with the target’s ra-
tional deliberation inasmuch as the target will deliberate, and presum-
ably choose and act, just as she would have. This act does not disrupt
its target’s extant trajectory of rational deliberation. However, all pa-
ternalistic reasoning operates with counterfactuals: The paternalist
reasons that by interceding in her target’s rational agency, the target
would (or will) choose or act differently—and better. According to the
rational will view, these counterfactuals will sometimes concern what
one’s target will do if one omits some action, thereby ensuring that the
target will continue to deliberate, choose, and act as the paternalist
expects. But the rational will view recognizes no basis for normatively
distinguishing between these counterfactuals and counterfactuals
about what one’s target will do if one performs some action, thereby
attempting to guide the target’s deliberation, choice, and action in the
ways the paternalist believes are better for the target. In either case, the
paternalist seeks to regulate her target’s rational agency because she
believes her own agency superior.
In a similar vein, the rational will view can also explain how offers
can be paternalistic. For example, suppose A, believing B is inferior to
her with respect to his rational capacities, bribes B to do X because A
believes B ought to do X for B’s own benefit. This is an instance of
paternalism because the reasons A’s bribe provides B for doing X do
not relate to the reasons B may have had for X prior to the bribe. A has
given B a reason to act as A believes B ought to act, but assuming that
the choice B must make is a typical one, this is the wrong kind of
reason, a state-given rather than an object-given reason, to use Derek
Parfit’s nomenclature (2001). A has in effect made it the case that B
ought to do X but not for the reasons that merit B’s doing X.
Admittedly, A has not circumvented B’s rational volition. Yet a con-
dition of A’s showing respect for B’s rational capacities is that A
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rationally persuades B to do X on the basis of X’s independent merits.
Such paternalistic offers may be all-things-considered justified, but
like some instances of rational persuasion, they nevertheless exhibit
the disregard for another’s rational capacities that morally speaks
against paternalism.
Let us conclude this section by noting how the rational will view ac-
counts for two widely acknowledged normative features of paternalism.
First, the rational will view provides a simple explanation of why
attempting to influence another’s choice or conduct through trans-
parently rational means typically deflects the charge of paternalism
(Shffrin 2000, p. 213). For even when one’s behaviour has other fea-
tures commonly associated with paternalism (for example, that one
aims to induce another person to act in ways that one perceives to be
in their interest), to provide reasons in the hope that doing so will
move another to act in a particular way indicates a desire to engage his
or her rational will. Providing reasons in the sincere hope of persuad-
ing another to act as you believe she ought expresses minimal confi-
dence in the other’s rational powers and amounts to giving the
individual the opportunity to demonstrate her rational competency
or judgment. But if a willingness to see if a putative target of pater-
nalism can be moved by sound reasons, and is therefore trustworthy
with respect to her rational competency or judgment, is evidence of
non-paternalistic intent,6 then overtaking another’s rational will by
substituting one’s own competency or judgment for the other’s
turns out to be essential to paternalism.
We should not, however, tie paternalism too closely to the rejection
of rational suasion. As I will detail further in §5, paternalism fails to
respect the other person qua rational agent. But as George Tsai (2014)
has recently argued, the mere fact that one provides reasons to another
in an effort to persuade her to act as one believes she ought does not
entail that one shows full respect for her rational agency. In providing
others with reasons, we do not ignore their rational capacities nor do
we directly substitute our judgments for theirs. But we can provide
others with reasons in ways that nevertheless fail to honour their
capacities for rational volition. We can, through the timing, tone,
etc., of our interactions with others provide them with reasons
6 I say ‘evidence’ because the willingness to see if rational suasion will move another to act
as one believes she ought is nevertheless compatible with lacking respect for her rational
agency. One might simply find rational suasion more convenient, etc., than non-rational,
paternalistic means of influencing her choices and conduct and so attach no special import-
ance to her rational agency.
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whilst nevertheless mistrusting their capacities as rational agents, thus
precluding their exercising their decision making capacities in ways
that are robust, authentic, and independent. For example, inundating
another agent with reasons relevant to a particular choice while subtly
pressuring him to make a speedy choice can make it difficult for that
agent to deliberate solely by reference to the reasons germane to that
choice. Tsai shows that there is more to respecting others’ rational
capacities—and hence more that is necessary to avoid paternalism—
than the provision of reasons. We must allow them to engage fully
with those reasons on their own terms, to work out for themselves
how such reasons bear on their choices. Only then can others exercise
their rational agency competently and authentically.7 In order that we
not be paternalistic in trying to persuade another, we must rationally
persuade her (as Aristotle might have said) in the right manner, at the
right moment, and in the right spirit. Indeed, when we act paternal-
istically, it can be said that our acts fail to exhibit the virtue of respect.
Secondly, the rational will view offers an elegant explanation as to
why another’s consent deflects charges of paternalism. When another
consents to our treating her in a particular way, we may still harbour the
belief that we have better judgment than she. Yet so long as a person’s
consent to our conduct is minimally rational, our treatment of that
person neither fails to engage her will nor amounts to literally substitut-
ing our judgment for hers, since her consent provides the judgment that
invalidates a charge of paternalism.8 Consent directly undermines cen-
tral features of paternalism as the rational will view understands it. The
rational will view can thus appeal to a condition or property—that
paternalism fails to engage another’s rational agency—intrinsic to pa-
ternalism itself in order to explain why persuading another or acting
with her consent obviates the charge of paternalism.
3. Three rational powers
It might appear that when an instance of paternalism is morally jus-
tified, this is only because its target is benefitted to a certain degree.
7 See Christman (2014) for an elaboration of competency and authenticity as conditions of
autonomy.
8 Such consent may not invalidate other charges levelled at such conduct (for example, that
it is manipulative, deceptive, etc.). Furthermore, the presence of consent makes it possible to
consent to being subject to force, for example, as psychiatric patients do when then consent to
Ulysses contracts regarding their treatment while incompetent, without such force being re-
jected as paternalistic.
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That model, I shall suggest here, is too simple to ground an adequate
casuistry of paternalism. According to the rational will view, the
wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalism amounts to
denying equal moral status to another because it intrudes into her
rational agency in ways that indicate judgments of inferiority. This
wrongmaking feature comes in degrees, I shall argue, because pater-
nalistic acts form a heterogeneous class. Paternalistic acts differ, I shall
argue, with respect to which of the rational powers that constitute our
rational agency they intercede in. In seeking the rational powers that
constitute rational agency, we are seeking the capacities necessary for
an individual to choose, intend, and act on reasons whose authorita-
tiveness or reasonableness she recognizes. The rational powers are
therefore those capacities needed for practical deliberation and
choice to be possible. They are what we possess ‘just in virtue of
being an agent’ (Shiffrin 2000, p. 219).
Here I will focus on those rational powers unique to practical, as
opposed to theoretical, rational agency. In his discussion of the value
of individuality, Mill asserts that those who do not aspire to individu-
ality, those content to let the world choose their plans of life for them,
need nothing more than the power of ‘ape-like imitation’. But those
seeking to forge their own paths in life must possess certain rational
powers:
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use
observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather
materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided,
firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. And these
qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his
conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings
is a large one. (Mill 1859, ch. 3, 4)9
Here Mill highlights three of the powers necessary for individuals to be
practically rational agents.
First, in order for practical deliberation and choice to commence,
we first ‘gather materials for decision’. An agent must begin her de-
liberation from some menu, however small, of options that she per-
ceives as in some respect minimally choiceworthy. We might call these
options reasons, considerations, concerns, etc. For ease of exposition, I
will call these options ends. Not every agent perceives every potential
9 Quong (2011, p. 81) similarly claims that the relevant abilities about which the paternalist
has a negative judgement are her targets’ ‘practical reasoning, willpower, and emotion
management’.
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end as minimally choiceworthy. This can be due simply to ignorance
of it as a possible end. In other cases, an agent can be aware of a
prospective end but see nothing intelligibly good about that end,
nothing that speaks in favour of it as an object of rational pursuit.
Warren Quinn (1993) offers the example of an individual with a desire
to turn on every radio she encounters. For most agents, the end served
by acting on this desire is, absent further information, simply not
intelligible. There is no description of this end under which most
agents find its pursuit good in the least. Granted, differences in indi-
vidual psychology can often explain why one agent finds an end min-
imally choiceworthy where another does not. And although this
capacity to perceive ends as choiceworthy is more a passive power
like perception than an active power like choice, it is a rational
power in that it involves a sensitivity to those facts that give us reasons
to adopt attitudes toward particular objects. Let us call this first ra-
tional power, the power to recognize ends as minimally choiceworthy,
the power of recognition.
Agents with the power of recognition must also be able to choose
among these ends and endorse some among them as worthy of being
pursued in action. This is a rational power in two senses. First, agents
sometimes must weigh competing or incompatible ends in order to
engage in rational choice or action. Second, in order for choice to be
rational, it must respond to the features of the ends chosen that render
those ends choiceworthy. In both of these respects, agents must attend
to and attach evaluative significance to various features of ends.
Following Mill, let us call this capacity to rationally select, from
among those goods one recognizes as minimally desirable or choice-
worthy, which goods to endorse and thereby render objects of rational
pursuit the power of discrimination.
Finally, agents must possess the ‘firmness and self-control’ necessary
to put their choices and intentions into action. Action essentially in-
volves pursuing those means, either causal or constitutive, to realize
the ends selected via the power of discrimination. Doing so requires
the exercise of instrumental rationality, or as I will call it, the power of
satisfaction.
Let us fix on a set of examples to illustrate how paternalistic inter-
cessions differ with respect to which of these rational powers are
engaged.
C, a recovered alcoholic, is aware of the genetic and environmental
factors that make it more likely that children of alcoholics will become
problem drinkers. Thus, C desires that her adult child, D, refrain from
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drinking alcohol. She desires this for D’s sake and believes that D’s
judgment or competency with respect to choosing whether to con-
sume alcohol is weaker than hers. She would very much prefer that D
not have to wrestle with alcohol in order to perceive its dangers, as C
did. If the above picture of our rational powers is correct, then C has
at her disposal several levers that she might pull in order to influence
D’s rational will in the hope that D will not drink. For reasons that will
become apparent shortly, let us confine our attention to paternalistic
intercessions in which C lies to or deceives D.
C could try to make it the case that D has no desire at all to drink
alcohol. The most decisive way to do so would be for C to eliminate
drinking from the menu of ends from which D can choose.
Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine how to do this. Perhaps C
could undertake a long-term program of ‘censorship’ directed at D,
designed to keep D ignorant of alcohol and its allure. She might dine
with D only at restaurants that do not serve alcohol, change the tele-
vision channel whenever alcohol advertisements are broadcast, inter-
fere with D’s personal relationships so that none of D’s friends imbibe,
etc. If C’s censorship campaign succeeds, then drinking will not appear
on the menu of minimally choiceworthy ends that D recognizes.
Another way for C to forestall D’s desiring to drink alcohol is to ‘tilt
the scales’ against drinking by making it seem relatively less choice-
worthy. C could achieve this by wilfully exaggerating the dangers of
alcohol to D, thus making D less likely to drink.
Finally, where C is confident that D endorses abstinence as an end,
C might take measures to ensure that D prudently pursues that end. C
might, for instance, deceive D about whether D’s companion, known
to be a heavy imbiber, has called to suggest that D join him for an
evening at the local watering hole.
The ways in which C might try to prevent D’s drinking illustrates
how different paternalistic intercessions target different rational
powers. When C undertakes the campaign to suppress D’s awareness
of alcohol and its appeal, C intercedes in D’s power of recognition,
taking alcohol off the menu of minimally choiceworthy ends that D
may choose to pursue. When C exaggerates the dangers of alcohol to
D, C intercedes in D’s power of discrimination, trying to make it the
case that drinking is not an end that D finds sufficiently attractive to
pursue, despite D’s continuing to recognize alcohol consumption as a
minimally choiceworthy end. In deceiving D regarding the invitation
to the local watering hole, C intercedes in D’s ability to successfully act
on his choices and so intercedes in D’s power of satisfaction.
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These three powers are obviously not sufficient on their own for
practical agency. As Mill saw, practical agents must also have other
perceptual and cognitive capacities in order to exercise their powers of
rational choice. But these powers do constitute the distinctly practical
or choice-orientated core of powers that a rational agent has.
4. Rational powers and respect for practical identities
With this sketch of the three rational powers in hand, I propose that
the rational will view of paternalism, according to which paternalism
involves substituting one’s judgment for another’s and thereby failing
to engage another’s rational will, ought to conceptualize the wrongs of
paternalism in terms of which of these rational powers paternalistic
acts seek to supplant. In other words, by understanding how various
kinds of paternalism attempt to supplant the three powers necessary
for rational volition, we can understand how various paternalistic
intercessions are illegitimate based on which of these powers they
intercede in. More specifically, this account locates the grounds for
opposition to paternalism in truths about individual identity.
According to this account, paternalism is a condemnation of our
competency as rational agents. But it is also a condemnation of who
we are—of important elements of our identity as individuals—and
this gives us a special reason for opposing paternalism.
As we noted in §1, one challenge associated with judging the wrong-
fulness of paternalism is that paternalistic acts are very often also acts
of another morally objectionable kind. This fact can make specific
judgments about the wrongfulness of paternalistic acts problematic.
For argumentative purposes however, the three examples provided in
the previous section have the advantage that they are also wrongs of
the same kind (or similar kinds), lies or acts of deception. Hence, this
set of examples should allow us to set aside the other wrongmaking
features paternalistic acts typically have and distil the distinctive pa-
ternalistic wrongs involved in each.
Our individual identities are not exhausted by our rational wills.
But the rational will dominates the practical identity around which a
large portion of interpersonal morality is orientated. When others
treat us paternalistically, they judge us inadequate or inferior as ra-
tional agents and substitute their judgment for ours on our behalf.
Others’ paternalism thus colonizes our identities as rational wills. In
interceding in the rational powers that constitute our rational agency,
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paternalists act wrongly because they attempt, perhaps only moment-
arily, to be us—to operate the levers of our rational agency on our
behalf.
But these intercessions colonize our rational wills in different ways,
based on which of the rational powers are interceded in.10 Hence, the
precise ways in which paternalists seek to supplant some element of
our practical identities varies, and as we might anticipate, the wrong-
fulness of paternalistic acts is partially determined by how they sup-
plant our practical identities. In fact, the rational powers stand in
relations such that intercessions in one power may also effectively
supplant others.
As Christine Korsgaard (1996, p. 100) puts it, ‘When you deliberate, it
is as if there were something over and above all your desires, something
which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on’. This stand-
point ‘over and above’ one’s desires is one’s rational agency or will. The
rational will—that something ‘over and above’ our particular choices
and desires—engages with possible objects of choice in order to fashion
plans or agendas for action. Competency as a rational agent, and one’s
identity qua rational agent, are thus determined by the relation between
one’s rational will and the objects of rational choice. Paternalism ‘comes
between me and my plans for myself ’ (Conly 2013, pp. 77, 190-2). When
C intercedes in D’s power of satisfaction by trying to prevent D from
joining his companion at the local drinking establishment, C shares D’s
agenda but doubts that D can successfully pursue that agenda. Hence, C
has interceded in D’s agenda in the weakest way possible, and though D
has reason to object to such an intercession, these reasons are relatively
weak because one’s power of satisfaction is not a power that is especially
definitive of oneself as a distinct practical agent.11 Given D’s agenda to
forego alcohol, the choice of how to satisfy this end is essentially the
same choice faced by any agent with the same agenda and equipped
with the same resources, constraints, etc. By settling all the normatively
important facts and settling on his practical agenda, D has already set
10 I do not intend that an act of paternalism can only intercede in one of these three
powers. No doubt some such acts intercede in more than one of these powers.
11 This claim comes with an important ‘all other things being equal’ clause: It may be that
for some deeply important end of mine (attending the church of my choice), interceding in
my power of satisfaction is something I would very strongly object to, perhaps more strongly
than I would object to having my power to satisfy some other less important end interfered
with (purchasing the brand of pasta of my choice). But I have in mind that different sorts of
intercessions in rational volitions are more or less objectionable relative to a given end, not
across different ends. All the other claims I make in this section regarding the objectionability
of paternalistic acts should be read in a similar, end-relative light.
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the parameters under which C’s intercession can be successful. So
though C intercedes in D’s agency by interceding in his power of sat-
isfaction, this intercession is relatively incidental to who D is as a ra-
tional agent with a particular history of decision and choice. The
rational power C supplants while acting on D’s behalf, while not trivial
in value, is not especially central to D’s identity as a distinct rational
agent.
However, when C intercedes in D’s power of discrimination by
lying to D about alcohol’s dangers, C seeks to influence D’s under-
standing of the facts that determine D’s choice agenda. With respect to
this particular agenda of D’s, C acts on D’s behalf by seeking to shift
the weight of reasons D recognizes in favour of not drinking. Notice
that even though C intercedes in the power of discrimination, her
intercession (if successful) will also shape how D exercises his power
of satisfaction. If D ends up believing C’s lies about alcohol’s dangers
and makes refraining from alcohol consumption his agenda, then D
must now exercise his power of satisfaction in order to satisfy this new
agenda. Whereas effective exercise of D’s power of satisfaction pre-
viously demanded he ascertain how to continue to drink, now effect-
ive exercise of that power demands he ascertain how not to. The
power of discrimination thus encompasses the power of satisfaction
in that the exercise of the former determines what counts as an effect-
ive exercise of the latter. Hence, intercessions in the former are, in
comparison with intercessions in the latter, more thoroughgoing col-
onizations of one’s rational powers, and hence amount to more com-
plete takeovers of one’s identity as a rational being.
This colonization of one’s identity as a rational being is even more
extensive when one intercedes in another’s power of recognition. Here
a successful intercession determines not just the actual agenda a
person will enact, but the scope of possible agendas she may enact.
Intercessions in the power of recognition are hence intercessions in an
agent’s ‘meta-agenda’. C’s attempted censorship campaign bears the
same relation to D’s power of satisfaction as did C’s lying to D about
alcohol’s dangers. Now D must determine how to refrain from drink-
ing. But in interceding in D’s power of recognition, C also shapes what
successful exercises of D’s power of discrimination look like. Absent
C’s intercession in D’s power of recognition, D’s power of discrimin-
ation would be directed at drinking as a possible end. With drinking
removed from D’s deliberative field, D can safely shape his practical
agenda without attending to the merits of alcohol. Thus, while the
power of discrimination encompasses the power of satisfaction in that
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the exercise of the former determines what constitute successful exer-
cises of the latter, the power of recognition encompasses both of these,
determining the conditions for the successful exercise of both
powers.12
We thus have reason to morally object to different forms of pater-
nalism depending on which of our rational powers are interceded in,
because these powers play different roles in determining how we ra-
tionally choose and deliberate and so play different roles in constitut-
ing us as rational agents. One might nevertheless believe than any of
the three intercessions described in the examples above are morally
justifiable despite their being paternalistic. However, if I am correct,
the justificatory burden a would-be paternalist faces depends in part
on which of the three rational powers she intends to intercede in. The
reasons needed to justify paternalistic intercessions in the power of
recognition must be stronger than the reasons needed to justify pa-
ternalistic intercessions in the power of discrimination, which in turn
must be stronger than the reasons needed to justify paternalistic inter-
cessions in the power of satisfaction. Put in contractualist terms, we
have stronger reasons to endorse a principle disallowing intercessions
in the power of recognition than to endorse a principle disallowing
intercessions in the power of discrimination (though of course we
have reasons to endorse both such principles). Likewise, we have
stronger reasons to endorse a principle disallowing intercessions in
the power of discrimination than to endorse a principle disallowing
intercessions in the power of satisfaction. Put differently: While our
practical identities—the goals, values, or concerns we identify with—
are no doubt influenced from many directions, the ultimate determin-
ation of our practical identities should largely be left up to us.
Paternalism is wrong because, and to the degree that, the paternalist
regulates the rational powers through which we fashion our identities.
Note that these claims are issued from the point of view of someone
targeted for paternalism, i.e., the reasons we have for rejecting
12 A referee for this journal suggests that recognition and satisfaction resemble one another
in that interceding in these powers involves arranging the world in a certain way, whereas
interceding in the power of discrimination is more direct in that the intercession aims to give
faulty weights to different possible ends. I grant that interceding in the power of discrimin-
ation is more causally direct than interceding in the other powers. This observation illustrates
that interceding in a person’s rational powers can involve the modification of the powers
themselves (or their operations) or the modification of the objects (‘the world’) at which
those powers are directed. However, this observation does not undermine the claims I make
here about the priority relations among the powers with respect to rational deliberation and
agency.
Mind, Vol. 0 . 0 . 2016  Cholbi 2016
Paternalism and our Rational Powers 17
 by guest on O
ctober 1, 2016
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
paternalistic intercessions in our own choices and actions vary accord-
ing to which of our rational powers such intercessions engage. For
their part, paternalists will presumably intercede in whichever power it
is easiest to engage so as to achieve their aims. Hence, even if (for
example) a paternalist could benefit her target by interceding in her
target’s power of discrimination, she may find it easier to achieve that
same aim by interceding in the target’s power of satisfaction. Indeed, if
my claims are correct, a conscientious paternalist will try to minimize
her ‘colonization’ of her target’s rational powers by opting to intercede
in the least fundamental power compatible with her achieving her
beneficent aim.
No matter whether a paternalist engages with the power of recog-
nition, of discrimination, or of satisfaction, the pro tanto wrong of
paternalism belongs to the same generic kind: She intercedes in those
powers so as to lead the agent to choose or act as she believes the agent
ought to choose or act, and she does so from the belief that she is more
competent than her target with regard to such choices and actions.
However, by arraying paternalistic intercessions in terms of which
rational powers they engage, the rational powers account provides a
richer account of how paternalism is presumptively, but not necessar-
ily, impermissible. Suppose we assume that paternalistic intercessions
can be all-things-considered justified if they are likely to augment their
targets’ welfare (or advance their ends) to some sufficiently high
degree. The rational powers account asserts that, for some given quan-
tum of welfare, the fact that a paternalistic act will likely provide that
quantum of welfare to its target must be measured against which of
the rational powers that act intercedes in. If for example a paternalistic
act provides sufficient welfare to its target to justify an intercession in
the power of recognition, then it also provides sufficient welfare to
justify an intercession in the powers of discrimination or satisfaction
(since justifying intercessions in these powers faces less of a burden
than justifying intercessions in the power of recognition). The con-
verse, however, will not necessarily hold. An intercession in the power
of satisfaction likely to yield a given quantum of welfare to its target
may not be great enough to meet the justificatory burdens imposed by
the powers of discrimination or recognition. Note that making welfare
relevant to the all-things-considered morality of paternalism does not
make the rational powers account ‘welfarist’: Paternalistic acts, just in
so far as they are paternalistic, trace their wrongfulness back to which
of the rational powers are interceded in, and there is no inherent
relationship between these powers and welfare. It is not the case, for
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example, that intercessions in the power of recognition necessarily
contribute more (or detract more) from their targets’ welfare than
intercessions in the other powers. So too for any other goods that
might be realized via paternalism (improvements in moral virtue,
say). The goodmaking features that may play a central role in the
all-things-considered justifiability of paternalism are therefore logic-
ally and normatively independent of paternalism’s wrongmaking fea-
ture, that it intercedes in others’ rational agency or volition.
And again, we must keep in mind that these features in turn logic-
ally interact with other morally salient features of paternalistic acts
(that they are deceptive, manipulative, violent, etc.) that determine the
all-things-considered moral permissibility of such acts. For instance,
an act that interferes with a target’s power of satisfaction (tying a
person to a chair so that she cannot eat a scrumptious dessert) may,
from a broader moral perspective, be more objectionable than an
act that achieves the same end by interfering with a target’s
power of discrimination (misleading the target about the dessert’s
scrumptiousness, say), despite the latter’s being more objectionable,
qua paternalistic act, than the former. How we intercede in an-
other’s rational powers can be as morally significant as what powers
we intercede in. But this, in my estimation, is what we should expect
from an account of paternalism’s wrongness: an explanation of why
paternalism is a strong reason against an act or policy, but not one
that accounts for every moral qualm we might have about paternalistic
acts.
5. Paternalism and mistrust
A second way of understanding the wrongmaking feature of paternal-
ism (on my rational powers account) appeals to the varying levels of
mistrust that paternalists show when they intercede in a person’s ra-
tional powers. The rational will view maintains that paternalism’s
wrongfulness rests on paternalists’ manifesting an attitude of super-
iority with respect to others’ rational volition or competency. We
desire to be trusted by others, to be seen as rationally competent
custodians of our own affairs. Being trusted is a prerequisite for in-
clusion, equal standing, and the kind of solidarity amidst diversity that
characterizes healthy social relations. Conversely, when we fail to trust
in one another’s rational powers, marginalization, hierarchy, and opa-
city in our social relations are the likely results.
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The three rational powers play distinct roles in our practical delib-
eration, and as a result, those who intercede in these powers show
distinct levels of mistrust in our competency as rational agents.
Consider first C’s intercession in D’s power of recognition, suppress-
ing D’s awareness of alcohol altogether so that D cannot recognize
alcohol consumption as even minimally choiceworthy. Such an inter-
cession profoundly manipulates the terms in which D can subse-
quently exercise his rational will. By taking alcohol consumption off
the menu of minimally choiceworthy ends D might choose, C has
sought to preclude D from selecting this as one of his ends. D ends
up ignorant of alcohol’s charms, and in this case, D’s ignorance of the
merits of this end may well be bliss. Still, C has concluded that D’s
judgment in this regard is sufficiently inferior to hers that it is best not
even to risk the prospect that D will choose to drink, and as a result
C’s paternalistic intercession makes it impossible for D to rationally
appraise the merits of drinking. D ends up not choosing to drink, but
not thanks to having been exposed to the merits of alcohol consump-
tion. Hence, with respect to alcohol consumption, C has substituted
her judgment for D’s in the most thorough and wide reaching way
possible. By removing alcohol consumption from D’s deliberative field
altogether, C has determined that D’s judgment is so impaired that D
ought not to deliberate about alcohol’s merits at all. C’s beliefs thus
reflect a deep mistrust of the competency of D’s rational will or agency.
In contrast, by interceding in D’s power of discrimination, C does
not remove alcohol consumption from D’s deliberative field. Instead,
C shapes D’s deliberation by modifying D’s reasons for drinking.
Hence, D ends up choosing not to drink as a consequence of a process
of rational deliberation that has been distorted by C’s exaggerating
drinking’s dangers. And unlike when C intercedes in D’s power of
recognition, here C trusts D enough to allow alcohol consumption
to be among the minimally choiceworthy ends D recognizes. However,
C judges that D is not as competent as she is in the appraisal of
alcohol’s merits. C thus allows D’s rational deliberation to take drink-
ing as one of D’s potential ends. In this respect, C’s interceding in D’s
power of discrimination is riskier (from her point of view) than her
interceding in D’s power of recognition. But should C’s paternalistic
intercession succeed, then D’s deliberation terminates in his rejecting
drinking as an end. Since here C puts more trust in D’s competency as
a rational will or agent, C’s beliefs reflect a moderate mistrust of the
competency of D’s rational will or agency.
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Finally, when C intercedes in D’s power of satisfaction by deceiving
D regarding the invitation to the watering hole, she continues to show
mistrust in D’s rational agency. C endorses D’s end of refraining from
alcohol. To this extent, C shows greater respect for D’s competency in
exercising his rational will than she does when she intercedes in his
powers of recognition or satisfaction. In C’s estimation, D can be
trusted to deliberate, on the basis of a factually accurate understanding
of the merits of alcohol consumption, about whether to drink alcohol.
All the same, C judges that D is not likely to exercise his power of
satisfaction adequately. Thus C does not trust D to act on those de-
liberations, since C believes D’s power to realize his chosen ends is
faulty. C’s beliefs thus reflect a modest mistrust of D’s rational will or
agency.
The forms of paternalism are thus as diverse as the species of ra-
tionality needed to function as rational agents. More exactly, pater-
nalistic intercessions in the power of recognition are more morally
objectionable than paternalistic intercessions in the power of discrim-
ination because the former show greater mistrust in the targeted
agent’s rational competency than do the latter, and paternalistic inter-
cessions in the power of discrimination are more morally objection-
able than paternalistic intercessions in the power of satisfaction
because the former show greater mistrust in the targeted agent’s ra-
tional competency than do the latter. Note that I have ascribed the
wrongfulness of paternalism to the level of mistrust a paternalistic act
shows, not to the level of mistrust a paternalistic actor feels. For the
mistrust shown by a paternalistic act need not exactly reflect the mis-
trust the paternalistic actor has toward her target. As stated earlier,
paternalists are likely to select their forms of intercession on instru-
mentalist grounds, interceding in whichever power will best enable
them to achieve their beneficent aims. Thus, even when a paternalist
mistrusts her target’s more fundamental rational power, she may
nevertheless find it reasonable to intercede in a less fundamental
power. In fact, on the view I have offered here, a paternalist is, all
other things equal, obligated to intercede in a lesser power even when
her mistrust extends to a more fundamental one. Such a paternalistic
act is more justified precisely because it does not express the full meas-
ure of distrust she has toward her target.
Consequently, because the rational powers one mistrusts need not
coincide with the rational powers one intercedes in, a paternalistic act
may not fully reflect the measure of the paternalist’s mistrust in her
target and the target’s rational powers. We must therefore be careful not
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to assimilate too readily a paternalist’s mistrust of her target’s rational
powers to the mistrust shown by her paternalistic act. The two avenues
by which the tripartite structure of rational agency can explain pater-
nalism’s wrongfulness, one appealing to how these powers contribute to
our identities as distinct rational agents, the other appealing to the levels
of mistrust manifest in interceding in the different powers constituting
that agency, are nevertheless closely linked. Judgments of trustworthi-
ness are characterological. Paternalism involves the judgment that with
respect to some matter with which another agent is concerned, that
agent cannot be fully trusted. The paternalist’s judgment that paternal-
ism is warranted thus embeds a judgment about the agent targeted for
paternalistic intercession. What I entrust you with is inseparable from
my beliefs about who you are.
6. Trust, respect, and deference
A fundamental objection to my rational powers account is that the
attitudes that motivate paternalistic intercessions can be epistemically
warranted. Suppose that I am correct that paternalistic acts are wrong
to the extent that they show mistrust in their targets’ rational powers.
Often though, we have evidence that others’ rational powers are
faulty—that it would be unwise for anyone, including those we
might subject to paternalism, to place their trust in those powers.
Self-described advocates of paternalism often appeal to this very fal-
libility in our powers of rational choice (Conly 2013). Why, they might
ask, should we refrain from interceding in others’ rational powers,
given that the wrongfulness of so doing rests on its mistrust of
those powers, if in fact those powers are not trustworthy?
Opponents of my rational powers account may conclude that it
thus requires a kind of dishonesty or make believe.
This objection can also be cast in terms of how paternalistic acts
colonize or overtake our rational powers: To the extent that our
identities as individuals are tied to our capacities as rational agents,
we have reasons to object to being treated paternalistically because the
paternalist supplants our rational agency with hers. However, it does
not seem as objectionable for the paternalist to supplant our rational
agency with hers if our rational agency malfunctions to such a degree
that our ensuing choices and actions are not well-grounded. If our
rational agency is of little instrumental value to us, its being sup-
planted by another’s hardly counts as a loss to us.
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Answering this objection requires an account of (1) exactly how
refraining from paternalism values rational agency properly, and (2)
why the failure to value such agency is a wrongmaking feature of
paternalism even when would-be paternalists have reason to judge
that their targets’ rational agency is not fully trustworthy.
I grant that my rational powers account rests on an ideal of rational
agency in two senses. First, we are not entirely rational. Our nature as
human individuals contains other elements besides our rational
agency, and not everything about us that is worthy of concern is
found within that rational agency. Hence, the rational powers account
idealizes inasmuch as it abstracts away from these other elements in
order to highlight the special role that rational agency has in explain-
ing the moral objectionability of paternalism. Second, we are not ne-
cessarily rational. Not all of our choices or decisions are made on
rational grounds, and some of those that are made on such grounds
are not made on good rational grounds. Rational agency is thus an
ideal that we value highly despite its being only imperfectly repre-
sented in our choices and actions.
But in what regard does refraining from paternalism properly value
others’ rational agency? ‘Value’ is a verb as well as a noun, an attitude
directed at objects for which that attitude is apt. In the case of rational
agency, its proper valuation seems to consist in honouring boundaries
between agents (even boundaries rendered more porous or pliable by
particular kinds of relations among agents, such as parents and chil-
dren, spouses, etc., or by professional role obligations). Paternalism, as
we have seen, elides such boundaries, as one agent substitutes her
judgment for another’s, thereby supplanting the latter’s rational
powers with her own. To honour such boundaries is to show respect
for what resides on the other side of the relevant boundary from
oneself (Darwall 2006, p. 268). And as Kant saw, respect for others
is an attitude marking moral distance or distinctness. Respect asks us
‘not to encroach upon what belongs to anyone’ (Kant 1797, p. 569),
including, presumably, others’ rational agency and the ends engaged
by that agency.
Each of us has ends for which we are concerned. Others may not
share our ends, of course. They may think, without inconsistency, that
our ends rest on reasons that do not strike them as forcefully as they
strike us, so that what is good enough reason for us to adopt a par-
ticular end may not be good enough reason for them to do the same.
Moreover, others may refrain from meddling in our ends and our
pursuit thereof for reasons unrelated to respect for us as fellow
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agents. They may, for instance, simply be indifferent to what ends we
pursue. Or they may fear the consequences of such meddling. Yet in
expecting their respect, we are, in part, asking others to adopt a par-
ticular stance on those ends, namely, to suppose that those ends rest on
adequate reasons. So in asking others to respect our ends, we are
asking them to adopt an egalitarian stance akin to Kant’s Kingdom
of Ends: to see our ends and our pursuit thereof as meriting respect
because they are manifestations of our rational agency, a respect that
others do not show when they intercede in that agency in order either
to better realize our ends or to realize ends they believe are better for
us to pursue.
But in showing respect toward our cares and concerns as manifest-
ations of our rational agency, others show respect toward that agency. If
our ends reflect adequate reasons, then the powers that constitute our
rational agency—the powers that enable practical deliberation—are
likely to be operating as they should. That the reasons for our ends
are adequate typically means that we are competent rational agents. Of
course, that the reasons underlying our ends are adequate is consistent
with our sometimes erring in our practical deliberations, in which case
the presumed adequacy of our reasons is coincidental. Yet even then,
respect for our rational agency militates against paternalism. Our ra-
tional powers are normative, rather than purely causal, powers, and so
it is a constitutive fact about them that they can, at least in principle, be
exercised inadequately. As we have observed, ‘respect’ carries a conno-
tation of treating something as distinct and independent, as having
boundaries that are not to be violated. Respect thus asks us to see the
value of a thing as residing in its integrity or wholeness rather than its
individual manifestations. As Isaiah Berlin pointed out, it would be a
‘monstrous impersonation’ of respect for rational agency to suppose
that it merits respect only when it operates impeccably (2002, p. 180).
In refraining from paternalism, we treat another’s will as authori-
tative for no other reason than that it is her will.13 Hence, showing
deference toward rational agents is an essential element of respecting
rational agency, of seeing rational agency as establishing boundaries
we have strong moral reasons not to trespass against. Such deference
generates a high bar for the evidence needed to persuade us that
someone’s rational agency is faulty and thus helps to explain the
13 As Groll (2014, p. 702) puts it, when a person is competent, we are to treat her will as
‘structurally decisive’, that is, as a source of de jure reasons that supersedes considerations such
as her welfare, etc.
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general moral presumption against paternalistic intercessions in
others’ agency. Notice that this does not mean that whether the
target of potential paternalism is trustworthy in their practical delib-
erations is irrelevant to paternalism or its justification. Ian Carter has
recently argued that respect:
is a substantive moral attitude that involves abstaining from looking
behind the exteriors people present to us as moral agents. More precisely,
while we may see behind these exteriors (for to do so is often unavoidable),
if and when we do perceive people’s varying agential capacities we refuse to
let such perceptions count as among the reasons motivating our treatment
of those people. In other words, we avoid evaluating people’s agential
capacities as an aid to deliberation about alternative courses of action.
(2011, p. 551)
But such abstinence has a limit. At some point, evidence of another’s
lack of trustworthiness can raise questions about whether they are
even minimally competent rational agents, in which case we descend
from ideal into non-ideal theorizing about paternalism. Carter again:
Treating persons as wholly opaque, in the sense of completely ignoring
their agential capacities, would be too strong, for it would preclude those
assessments that are necessary in order to have the reasonable belief that
they have any agential capacities at all. We perceive individuals as moral
agents because we perceive them as having at least a certain minimum of
agential capacities. (2011, p. 552)
The moral demand Carter dubs ‘opacity respect’ thus asks us to pre-
scind from judgments about others’ rational capacities so long as their
capacities exceed a minimal threshold. When they do not reach this
threshold, respecting rational agency gives way to valuing rational
agency, i.e., seeking to promote or restore it through means that
might otherwise be objectionably paternalistic (Christman 2014,
p. 373).
Respect for others’ rational agency is thus a moral demand that is
imperfectly sensitive to our evidence concerning others’ rational
agency. It asks us to discount or bracket evidence we may have con-
cerning the competence of others’ rational agency in order to respect
them as rational agents. It may seem odd that a moral demand can
have implications regarding our epistemic obligations—that a moral
stance we take toward others can imply an epistemic stance we must
take toward others. But there are instances in which our moral obli-
gations require us to forego the pursuit of particular knowledge or
information, such as when the right to privacy entails an obligation
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not to pursue certain evidence regarding another’s behaviour or when
the right to provide informed consent to medical interventions con-
strains what evidence physicians may gather in their research. The
deference involved in respecting rational agency generates obligations
of a different epistemic kind, compelling us (at least to some degree)
to disregard evidence concerning an agent’s rational competence. It
thus operates somewhat like legal obligations, imposed on judges, to
set aside evidence resting on hearsay or acquired via coercion.
In conflicts between moral normativity and epistemic normativity,
the former often wins out (Wrenn 2004). In the case of paternalism,
the epistemic imperfections of our rational agency do not, as some
enthusiasts for paternalism would have it (Conly 2013, p. 40), mean
that rational agency cannot be respected in general or when exercised
inadequately. The possibility of error is built into any normative
power, so that respect for rational agency requires respect for a fallible
power. So our rational agency, and the choices and actions that flow
from it, can and ought to be respected even on those occasions when
our exercises thereof are less than sterling.
Of course, precise judgments regarding whether an individual is
essentially rational but exercising her rational powers badly, as
opposed to not satisfying the conditions of rational agency at all,
may be difficult to come by (Cholbi 2011). A modification to my
earlier example serves to illustrate this point: As far as paternalism
goes, C faces a rather different set of moral challenges if, instead of
trying to prevent D from picking up a drinking habit in the first place,
C is attempting to stop D from drinking when D is already an alco-
holic or ‘problem drinker’. Should C be concerned about paternalism
in the way I have represented it—as an intercession in D’s rational
powers—or should C conceptualize her interventions as non-pater-
nalistic, on the grounds that while she aims to improve D’s well-being,
D’s addiction has obliterated the rational powers intercession in which
would count as paternalistic in the first place? ‘Paternalistic’ interven-
tions in the choices and actions of the mentally ill raise similar worries.
Obviously, much will depend on the details of particular cases like
these: how compromised the rational powers are, which powers are
compromised, etc. However, my taxonomy of the rational powers can
still illuminate these matters. To the extent that addicts or the men-
tally ill retain their rational powers, interceding in recognition is more
objectionable than discrimination, which in turn is more objection-
able than interceding in satisfaction, etc. And even if it is determined
that the target lacks these rational powers and is therefore not a
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rational agent, a moral justification for interceding is still needed des-
pite these intercessions not rightfully being classified as paternalistic
(Feinberg 1986, pp. 12-3). That an intercession in others’ actions or
choices is not paternalistic does not make it morally unproblematic.
Such a justification may rest on the value of rational agency, but not
on respecting it. The justification may instead rest on aims such as
protecting or promoting rational agency. My aim here has been to show
how the wrongfulness of various paternalistic acts can be mapped onto
the architecture of rational agency, not to appraise possible justifica-
tions for intervening in the choices or actions of beings who are not
rational agents. That ‘non-ideal’ project must be addressed elsewhere
(Jaworska 1999; Schapiro 1999; Cholbi 2002).
7. The varieties of paternalism
Finally, let us note that the rational powers account helps make sense
of some widely held views about the moral objectionability of different
varieties of paternalism.
For instance, strong paternalism faces a higher burden of proof than
does weak paternalism. Strong paternalism is directed toward a person
whose choice of ends is, in the estimation of the paternalistic inter-
venor, mistaken or irrational. Weak paternalism, in contrast, is dir-
ected toward a person whose choices and actions will, in the
estimation of the paternalistic intervenor, frustrate or undermine
that person’s ends. In general, strong paternalism seems more morally
problematic than weak paternalism for reasons that my rational
powers account illuminates. The strong paternalist mistrusts her tar-
get’s capacity to select worthwhile or choiceworthy ends. Hence, the
strong paternalist is likely to be more willing to intercede in those
powers—the powers of recognition and discrimination—intercession
in which shapes the ends a person chooses. Again, this willingness
need not translate directly into interceding in these more fundamental
powers. But the strong paternalist, given her willingness to shape both
her target’s ends and the chosen means to those ends, would presum-
ably not hesitate to intercede in the powers associated with identifying
and choosing ends (recognition and discrimination).
Weak paternalism, on the other hand, is motivated by concern not
for the ‘wisdom, prudence, or dangerousness’ per se of its target’s
chosen ends but by concern that the target’s choices and actions
are, as means to her chosen ends, at odds with those ends (Feinberg
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1986, p. 12). The weak paternalist thus aims to make her target’s choice
of action align with the target’s ends. The weak paternalist is thus
likely not to try to modify her target’s ends but to intercede in the
target’s power of satisfaction so that the target’s choices in fact satisfy
her ends. Hence, while not all instances of weak paternalism will be
less morally objectionable, either qua paternalistic or from an all-
things-considered perspective, than all instances of strong paternalism,
the view I have developed thus far explains why this will usually be the
case: Strong paternalism intercedes in rational powers the intercession
in which shows greater mistrust in its target’s rational competency
than similar weak paternalist intercessions in the power of satisfaction.
Likewise, my version of the rational will view sheds light on many
philosophers’ relative enthusiasm for soft over hard paternalism. Soft
paternalists maintain that while we may not act paternalistically to
prevent a person from knowingly and voluntarily engaging in self-
harm, we may act paternalistically if doing so is necessary to determine
whether a person is knowingly and voluntarily intending to self-harm.
To use a timeworn example, soft paternalists do not deny that someone
has the right to walk across a damaged bridge, but they permit others to
interfere with her intention to do so if they have reason to believe that
she is not aware of its fragile condition. Hard paternalists reject this
condition, allowing paternalism to prevent self-harm even when a
person knowingly and voluntarily intends such harm to herself. Hard
paternalists thus assert that we may sometimes prevent others from
acting on ends they have rationally chosen. Hard paternalism is thus
more morally objectionable than soft paternalism, according to my
version of the rational will view, because it intercedes in a more fun-
damental rational power—the power of discrimination—than does soft
paternalism, which is aimed at ensuring that agents are exercising their
power of satisfaction in accordance with their rationally chosen ends.
8. Conclusion
Gerald Dworkin has observed that debates about paternalism, while
‘about facts … and how effective various policies are’, are also ‘cru-
cially about different ideals of the person’ (2013b). Here I have argued
for a version of the rational will view of paternalism—the rational
powers account—that takes very seriously the ideal of the person as
a rational agent, with particular attention to the architecture of
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rational agency and the ways in which various paternalistic acts or
policies can intercede in that architecture.
I have not taken up some disputes regarding paternalism. For ex-
ample, I have not weighed in on whether paternalism intercedes in an-
other’s rational will so as to advance her interests or well-being or
whether paternalism can also occur when one intercedes in another’s
rational will for the sake of her ends, including her non-self-interested or
other-regarding ends. Nevertheless, by explaining a wide range of ethical
data about paternalism in a parsimonious way, my rational powers ac-
count of paternalism appears to offer the foundation of a plausible
philosophical theory of paternalism. It provides powerful explanations
of why rational suasion usually deflects charges of paternalism; why
consenting to intercessions in one’s rational agency negates paternalism;
why we ordinarily believe that strong paternalism is more objectionable
than weak paternalism; and why we ordinarily believe that hard pater-
nalism is more objectionable than soft paternalism. And although my
defence of the rational powers account does not strive to provide a
complete casuistry of paternalistic acts and policies, it suggests how
such an account might be developed so as to make sense of the intui-
tively plausible claim that paternalism is presumptively, but not neces-
sarily, impermissible. Admittedly, the rational will view’s characterization
of paternalism is not normatively neutral, since it refers to wrong or
badmaking features of paternalism (Bullock 2015). However, it is also not
objectionably partial, since it also refers to apparently goodmaking fea-
tures of paternalism, namely, that (successful) paternalism helps its tar-
gets secure their ends or the ends they ought to seek. Hence, the rational
will view does not illicitly close off debates about the pros and cons of
particular instances of paternalism. After all, proponents of paternalism
can grant that such normatively ‘loaded’ definitions are correct while
attempting to show that the bad or wrongmaking feature is either merely
prima facie or is outweighed by its goodmaking feature.14
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